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(See, also, Comer v. Associated Almond Growers, 101 Cal.App. 
687 [282 P. 532]; 30 Am.Jur. § 207, p. 944; 50 C.J.S. § 597, 
p. 15; Rest. of Judg., § 62, at p. 257.) 
Various cases cited by the defendant (e.g. Estate of Keet, 
15 Cal.2d 328 [100 P.2d 1045] ; Ernsting v. United Stages, 
Inc., 206 Cal. 733 [276 P. 103]; Henderson v. Miglietta, 
206 Cal. 125 [273 P. 581]; Gaskill v. Wallace, 32 Cal.App.2d 
354 [89 P.2d 687]), involving the effect of the res judicata 
doctrine and the admission of the evidence outside the judg-
ment roll of the earlier action are not in point. No waiver 
of a right to rely on the prior judgment was shown by the 
comments of court and counsel as is true in this case. The 
defendant's argument that he did nothing to prevent proof 
of negligence in the earlier action ignores the fact that he 
secured a judgment in that action on the basis of a repre-
sentation that a contractual liability only was involved. 
The findings and conclusions of the trial court are sup-
ported by the record. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., 
Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
[Crim. No. 5269. In Bank. Mar. 7, 1952.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ROBERT GENE 
DESSAUER, Appellant. 
[1] Homicide- Evidence- Deliberation and Premeditation.-De-
fendant's statement to arresting officers that he purchased a 
gun intending to kill his woman companion and carried out 
that intent is sufficient evidence to show that the murder was 
perpetrated by a "willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing." 
(Pen. Code, § 189.) 
[2] Id.-Evidence-Premeditation.-1\!Iere statement by defendant 
to arresting officers that his motive in killing his woman com-
panion was to have her die while she was happy does not elimi-
nate the element of premeditation, and in any event need not 
be believed by the court in a nonjury case. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3] Homicide, § 158; [ 4] Homicide, 
§§ 149, 158; [5, 6] Criminal Law, § 106; [7] Criminal Law, § 1079; 
[8] Criminal Law, § 235(3); [9] Stipulations, § 3(3); [10] Homi-
cide, § 242; [11] Criminal Law, § 480; [12] Homicide, § 273. 
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[3] Id.-Evidence-Motive.-Establishment of motive for commis-
sion of a homicide is not indispensable to support a conviction. 
[4] !d.-Evidence-Corpus Delicti: Deliberation and Premedita-
tion.-Evidence that defendant had a gun in the back of his 
car, that he entered the back seat rather than the front seat 
where his woman companion was seated, and that, after a 
conversation with her and with no apparent provocation, he 
aimed the gun at the back of her head and shot her four 
times, causing her death, is sufficient to indicate an intent to 
kill and is proof of the corpus delicti aside from his extra-
judicial statements to the arresting officers; such statements, 
together with the other evidence, clearly establish deliberation 
and premeditation. 
[5] Criminal Law-Rights of Accused-Right to be Confronted by 
Witnesses-Waiver.-Right of accused to be confronted by 
witnesses, whether assured by the Constitution or statute, may 
be waived, and a trial may be had on the transcript of the 
evidence taken at the preliminary hearing on stipulation by 
defendant and his counsel or by the latter's stipulation, at 
least when made in defendant's presence. 
[6] !d.-Rights of Accused-Right to be Confronted by Witnesses 
-Waiver.-Right of accused to confront the doctors or alien-
ists making reports as to the sanity issue may be waived. 
[7] Id.-Appeal-Objections-Evidence.-A waiver or failure to 
object to the admission of evidence precludes objection on 
appeal. 
[8] !d.-Right to Separate Trial on Insanity Issue-Waiver.-At 
least in a case tried by the court without a jury, the right to 
have guilt and insanity separately tried may be waived. 
[9] Stipulations-Subject Matter-Evidence.-Defendant's counsel 
may stipulate that the degree and penalty of the murder 
charged can be determined on the evidence adduced at the trial. 
[10] Homicide-Punishment for First Degree Murder-Discretion 
of Jury.-Any right of defendant in a homicide case to invoke 
Pen. Code, § 190, which provides that persons guilty of first 
degree murder shall suffer death or life imprisonment at the 
discretion of the jury "trying the same," is waived where the 
right to a trial by jury has been waived. 
[11] Criminal Law-Evidence-Confessions-Review.-A defend-
ant charged with murder may not suecessfully urge that there 
was no showing that the statement he made to the police 
[3] See Cal.Jur., Homicide,§ 74; Am.Jur., Homicide,§ 465. 
[5] See Cal.Jur., Criminal Law, § 76; Am.Jur., Criminal Law, 
§ 188. 
[7] See Cal.Jur., Criminal Law, § 516; Am.Jur., Appeal and 
Error, § 343. 
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following the crime was free and voluntary, where there was 
no intimation during the trial that the statement was coerced 
in any respect, no suggestion of coercion was made at the 
time he was questioned on direct examination in regard to 
the manner in which his statement was made, and he testified 
that he told a different story to the police then and on the 
stand as to why he purchased the gun used in the crime, because 
he thought the officers wanted him to answer that way or 
because of despondency. 
[12] Homicide-Appeal-Modification of Judgment.-Where the 
evidence is ample to establish first degree murder and no 
prejudicial error was committed by the trial court, the Supreme 
Court has no power to reduce the degree of the crime or the 
penalty imposed. 
APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239) 
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County 
and from an order denying a new trial. Clement D. Nye, 
Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for murder. ,Judgment of conviction imposing 
death penalty affirmed. 
Morris Lavine for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Stanford D. 
Herlick, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-Defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty 
by reason of insanity to a charge of murder. After trial 
by the court sitting without a jury he was found sane and 
guilty of murder of the first degree and sentenced to death. 
His motion for a new trial was denied. The case is here 
on automatic appeal from the judgment and order deny-
ing the new trial. 
Defendant, 28 years of age, and Libby Bershad, the vic-
tim of the homicide, had been living together as husband 
and wife since June, 1950, without legal sanction. Appar-
ently one source of their income for a living embraced vari-
ous activities, such as prostitution by Libby, bad check pass-
ing and the "badger" game, wherein she would entice a 
man into their living· quarters and while they were in a 
compromising situation, defendant, posing as her husband, 
would enter demanding monetary satisfaction. 
According to defendant's testimony in court, he and Libby 
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left their place of abode in Hollywood to do some shopping 
about 7 in the morning on April 2, 1951. After articles of 
apparel were purchased for Libby with cash and bad checks, 
they returned to Hollywood in defendant's car arriving 
about 2 in the afternoon. They stopped in front of a bank 
and Libby gave him a check to cash. He entered the bank 
to cash the check, but knowing it would not be paid, he got 
"cold feet" and returned to the car, taking a position in 
the rear seat, Libby being in front, where a discussion en-
sued in which he told her why he did not attempt to pass 
the check, and she told him he should not have been afraid. 
'fhey did not have an argument or quarrel. He owned a 
gun which he had placed on the floor in front of the back 
seat of the car. While she was facing forward, he held the 
gun about 8 inches from the back of her head and shot four 
times, causing her death. He then left the car intending 
to surrender to the authorities. Not finding an officer he 
attended a theater for about an hour. He went to a restau-
rant where he made some notes on blank checks, and about 
8 in the evening called the police. They came to the res-
taurant and took him into custody. He denied he had any 
intent to kill Libby before the shots were fired or that he 
purchased the gun to kill her. He said he shot her because 
she was in trouble and would eventually be imprisoned; he 
also said he had purchased the gun at Libby's suggestion 
for protection and to use in the "badger" games. 
In a statement made to the officers, defendant stated that 
Libby and he had discussed suicide because they had nothing 
for which to live and she had attempted it several times; 
that he first decided to kill Libby about a month before 
the homicide "because she told me that life, as it was, wasn't 
worth living, she wasn't having a very good time, and neither 
was I, it was rough and unpleasant, and we saw no end in 
sight, a happy end"; because they were unhappy by reason 
of lack of money; that he purchased the gun for the "spe-
cific reason'' of killing her; that he carried his plans to con-
clusion on the day of the homicide; and that he put the 
gun in his pocket on the morning of that day before they 
left their home with the thought of killing her. 
[1] Contrary to defendant's contention the evidence is 
adequate to establish first degree murder. His statement to 
the officers shows that he purchased the gun intending to 
kill Libby and carried out that intent. Clearly, there is 
sufficient evidence to show that murder was perpetrated by 
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a ''willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing.'' (Pen. 
Code, § 189.) [2] Defendant seems to think that because 
he said his motive was to have her die while she was happy 
the element of premeditation was eliminated. This does not 
necessarily follow, but even if it did, the court could have 
disbelieved that evidence. The killing could be found 
to be malicious, because ''. . . malice may be express or 
implied. It is express when there is manifested a delib-
erate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow-
creature. It is implied, when no considerable provocation 
appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing 
show an abandoned and malignant heart.'' (Pen. Code, 
§ 188.) [3] Moreover, the establishment of a motive for 
the commission of a homicide is not indispensable to sup-
port a conviction. (People v. lsby, 30 Cal.2d 879 [186 P.2d 
405]; 13 Cal.Jur. 685.) 
[4] Further in this connection defendant urges that 
the statements of defendant to the officers could not be used 
to show the premeditation and deliberation sufficient to es-
tablish the crime of murder of the first degree; and that 
such must be proved by other evidence. If he is speaking 
of proof of the corpus delicti, there was adequate evidence 
aside from his extrajudicial statements to establish it. It 
will be recalled that there is evidence that he had the gun 
in the back of his car and when he returned to the car 
from the bank he entered the back seat rather than the 
front seat where Libby was seated. .After a conversation 
with her and with no apparent provocation he aimed the 
gun at the back of her head and shot her four times. That 
is sufficient to indicate an intent to kill and proof of the 
corpus delicti aside from his extrajudicial statements. (See 
People v. Corrales, 34 Cal.2d 426 [210 P.2d 843] ; People 
v. JJ1ehaffey, 32 Cal.2d 535 [197 P.2d 12]; People v. Stroble, 
36 Cal.2d 615 [226 P.2d 330].) If he means that his 
statements cannot be used in support of the proof of deliber-
ation and premeditation, and hence, first degreee murder, 
he cites no authority so holding. His statements together 
with the other evidence clearly established deliberation and 
premeditation. (See People v. Briggs, 20 Cal.2d 42 [123 
P.2d 433] .) In People v. Howa.rd, 211 Cal. 322 [295 P. 333, 
71 A.L.R. 1385], relied upon by him there were no facts 
in the extrajudicial statement from which premeditation 
could be inferred. In People v. Thomas, 25 Cal.2d 880 [156 
P.2d 7], the court was pointing out the closeness of the case 
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and hence the necessity for correct instructions on delibera-
tion and premeditation. The admissions there made and 
other evidence are not comparable to this case. 
Under a claim of denial of due process of law, defendant 
makes various contentions that the State's case was based 
on the transcript of the testimony taken at the preliminary 
hearing, and as to the sanity issue, on reports, rather than 
testimony in court, by alienists, containing sordid accounts 
of defendant's sex life, and that there was no confrontation 
of witnesses against him. Defendant was represented by 
counsel at the preliminary hearing and witnesses were cross-
examined. He and his counsel waived a trial by jury on 
both the issue of guilt and insanity. His counsel at the 
opening of the trial stipulated that ''the People's case may 
be submitted to the Court on the testimony taken at the 
preliminary examination; that the Court may read the tran-
script of that testimony to the same force and effect as though 
those witnesses were here, sworn and testified, the defendant 
waiving his right to further cross examination of those wit-
nesses and waiving his right to be confronted by those wit-
nesses, and any stipulations entered into at the preliminary 
hearing may be deemed entered into at this proceeding, and 
any exhibits received at the preliminary hearing may be 
received and marked as exhibits here.'' The use of doctors' 
reports was also stipulated, as will more fully appear later 
herein. [5] The right to be confronted by witnesses, whether 
assured by Constitution or statute, may be waived, and a 
trial may be had on the transcript of the evidence taken 
at the preliminary hearing on stipulation by defendant and 
his counsel (People v. Wallin, 34 Cal.2d 777 [215 P.2d 1] ), 
or by the latter's stipulation, at least when made in defend-
ant's presence. (People v. Rornero, 100 Cal.App.2d 352 
[223 P.2d 511]; People v. Young, 100 Cal.App.2d 488 [224 
P.2d 46] .) [6] It follows that the right to confront the 
doctors was also properly waived. Insofar as the admissibility 
of the reports is concerned that cannot be raised in the face 
of the stipulation. [7] A waiver or failure to object to the ad-
mission of evidence precludes objection on appeal. ( 8 Cal. 
Jur. 500 et seq.) In any event no prejudice has been shown. 
(See People v. Stroble, sttpra, 36 Cal.2d 615.) 
After the prosecution had finished its case on the issue 
of guilt, the court called defendant's counsel's attention to 
the fact that the previous stipulations had not covered the 
doctors' reports on the issue of insanity. Defendant's counsel 
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then stipulated "that the Court may read and consider the 
reports of the doctors on the second issue of not guilty by 
reason of insanity .... [T]hat the Court may read and 
consider the reports of the doctors, Dr. Bielinski and Dr. 
Tucker, submitted as a result of their appointment under 
Section 1026 and following Sections of the Penal Code in 
determining the issue of the Defendant's plea of not guilty 
by reason of insanity .... And such other doctors' reports 
as may be submitted by either prosecution or defense.'' A 
report by a Dr. Bailey was submitted by defendant's coun-
sel. 'l'he People then rested and defendant was called to 
the stand and testified. After defendant rested the State 
called a rebuttal witness. At the end of the case defend-
ant's counsel stipulated that both issues, guilt and insanity, 
could be determined ''at the one pronouncement.'' The court 
then found defendant guilty of murder of the first degree 
and sane. At the time of pronouncement of the sentence, 
defendant stood mute when asked if there was any legal 
cause why sentence should not be pronounced, and his coun-
sel said there was no cause. The death penalty was im-
posed. 
In that state of the record defendant contends that a re-
versal is required because the two issues were not tried sep-
arately, as required by the statute reading: "When a de-
fendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity, and also 
joins with it another plea or pleas, he shall first be tried 
as if he had entered such other plea or pleas only, and in 
such trial he shall be conclusively presumed to have been 
sane at the time the offense is alleged to have been com-
mitted. If the jury shall find the defendant guilty ... 
then the question whether the defendant was sane or insane 
at the time the offense was committed shall be promptly 
tried, either before the same jury or before a new jury in 
the discretion of the court. In such trial the jury shall 
return a verdict either that the defendant was sane at the 
time the offense was committed or that he was insane at 
the time the offense was committed. If the verdict or find-
ing be that the defendant was sane at the time the offense 
was committed, the court shall sentence the defendant as 
provided by law.'' (Pen. Code, § 1026.) Defendant also 
contends that evidence was not taken to determine the pen-
alty, that a jury was not summoned for that purpose and 
that those things could not be waived. 
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It is clear from the record that the manner of conducting 
the trial on the issues and determining the penalty was 
with the consent of defendant's counsel. He, at no time, 
made any objection to the procedure. He either tacitly or 
expressly assented. In regard to the penalty the court had 
all the facts surrounding the commission of the crime before 
it and also the reports of three doctors on defendant's mental 
status. 
[8] At least in a case tried by the court without a jury 
the right to have guilt and insanity separately tried may 
be waived. (People v. Hazelwood, 24 Cal.App.2d 690 [76 
P.2d 151] ; People v. Pettinger, 94 Cal.App. 297 [271 P. 
132].) Those cases have not been disapproved, as claimed 
by defendant, by the later cases such as People v. French, 
12 Cal.2d 720 [87 P.2d 1014], setting forth the procedure 
for separation of the trial of the two issues. Moreover, de-
fendant has not shown he suffered prejudice. (People v. 
Stroble, supra, 36 Cal.2d 615.) 
[9] In regard to the determination of the degree and 
penalty it is settled that defendant's counsel may stipulate 
that they be determined on the evidence adduced at the trial. 
(People v. Walker, 33 Cal.2d 250 [201 P.2d 6] ; People v. 
Thomas, 37 Cal.2d 7 4 [230 P .2d 351].) That is in effect 
the situation here. 
[10] In regard to the lack of a jury to determine the 
penalty to be imposed, defendant invokes section 190 of the 
Penal Code, which provides that persons guilty of first de-
gree murder shall suffer death or life imprisonment at the 
discretion of the jury ''trying the same.'' If any such 
right existed it was waived, as seen from the above discus-
sion. Moreover, where the case is tried by the court after the 
jury has been waived we do not have a case within the lan-
guage of section 190, that is, where the jury is trying it. 
Defendant urges that the waivers should not be sustained 
because defendant's sanity was doubtful and he could not be 
expected to act intelligently. The alienists appointed by the 
court and the one chosen by defendant all agreed that de-
fendant was sane at the time of the commission of the crime 
and when examined. The trial was had on July 18, 1951, 
and the reports of those doctors were dated July 16, May 
29 and 27, 1951. From his testimony at the trial he ap-
peared entirely rational. 
[11] Defendant contends that there was no showing that 
the statement he made to the police was free and voluntary. 
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There was no intimation or suggestion at any time during 
the trial that the statement was coerced in any respect. De-
fendant was questioned on direct examination in regard to 
the manner in which his statement was taken and no sug-
gestion of coercion was mentioned. He testified that he told 
a different story to the police then and on the stand as 
to why he purchased the gun, to "obviate things," that is, 
because he thought the officers wanted him to answer that 
way or because of despondency. 
[12] Defendant contends that the offense should be re-
duced by this court to second degree murder, or the penalty 
reduced to life imprisonment. The evidence, however, is, 
as we have seen, ample to establish first degree murder and 
no prejudicial error was committed by the trial court. This 
court has no power to reduce the degree of the crime or 
the penalty imposed in the absence of error, or to review 
the discretion of the trial court in fixing the penalty. (Peo-
ple v. Odle, 37 Oal.2d 52 [230 P.2d 345] ; People v. Thomas, 
supra, 37 Oal.2d 74 [230 P.2d 351].) 
The judgment and order are affirmed. 
Gibson, 0. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
Schauer, J., concurred in the judgment. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied March 31, 
1952. 
